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Particular Social Groups
VAGUE DEFINITIONS AND AN INDETERMINATE
FUTURE FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS
INTRODUCTION
Victims fleeing their native countries in order to escape
violence, discrimination, or persecution are provided a limited
number of mechanisms under current immigration law in which
to seek refuge in the United States. The Immigration &
Nationality Act (INA) governs the claims of all applicants
seeking asylum in the United States.1 Under the INA, aliens
entering the United States (or who are already present within its
borders) are eligible for asylum if they qualify under one of five
protected grounds.2 Aliens must be seeking asylum based upon
persecution related to their “race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”3 Critically, the INA
requires aliens prove a nexus between their claimed protected group
and their fear of harassment or mistreatment—there must be a
causal connection between their fear of persecution (or the actual
persecution that they have suffered) and their membership in one of
these five protected grounds.4
Such burdens of proof create difficulties for an applicant
under any of the five protected grounds, but no ground has been
subject to more dispute and judicial analysis than “membership
in a ‘particular social group.’”5 The complete lack of statutory
guidance surrounding what constitutes a particular social group
is controversial and confusing, as the INA provides no language

See generally Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012).
Id. § (b)(1)(B)(i).
3 Id.
4 Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1), (2)(i)(A) (2017).
5 Ariel Lieberman, What Is A “Particular Social Group”?: Henriquez-Rivas
Provides A Possible Solution to Circuit Courts’ Confusion, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 455, 456
(2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). Issues of proof and definition of the other four
protected grounds—“race, religion, nationality, . . . [and] political opinion”—are beyond
the purview of this note. Id.
1
2
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defining this protected ground.6 Thus, the guiding framework
and eligibility criteria establishing membership in a particular
social group has come from U.S. case law.7
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the appellate
tribunal for immigration courts, has presented an evolving number
of definitions of what makes up a particular social group in the
past.8 In 2014, however, the BIA decided two cases simultaneously
that set the new standard definition of what elements constitute
membership in a particular social group. In Matter of W-G-R- and
Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA created a three-element test that
must be satisfied in order to establish eligibility in this protected
group.9 Under this test, an applicant “must establish that the group
is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially
distinct within the society in question.”10
With the adoption of this new standard, courts have struggled
in applying all three elements, but the “particularity” and “social
visibility” elements have proven the most challenging and the source
of much judicial analysis.11 Indeed, there is a split amongst the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals over the adoption of many elements of the
BIA’s new standard.12 The confusion and controversy over this new
standard has created tremendous difficulties for asylum applicants
who, demonstrating a reasonable fear of returning to their native
countries, have credible claims but otherwise do not qualify under one
of the other four protected grounds. In particular, for those escaping
violence in their native countries—both domestic and gang-related—
the situation is especially dire.13
While the purpose of this note is singular in focus, it has
been divided into three parts. Part I analyzes the standard set by
the BIA in 2014 in Matter of W-G-R- and Matter of M-E-V-G-and
includes a glimpse into the statutory and regulatory foundation of
the definition of a particular social group. Part II explores the
6 See Lieberman, supra note 5, at 456–57; see also Immigration and
Nationality Act § 208. Nor does the definition section of the INA provide any
clarification. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a).
7 Lieberman, supra note 5, at 458–59; Kenneth Ludlum, Defining Membership
in A Particular Social Group: The Search for A Uniform Approach to Adjudicating
Asylum Applications in the United States, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 115, 116, 119 (2015).
8 See Ludlum, supra note 7, at 119–24.
9 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014) (both cases were decided on February 7, 2014).
10 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 208; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I & N. Dec.
at 227. See discussion infra Part I for a complete analysis of these elements and their
aftermath.
11 See Lieberman, supra note 5, at 461.
12 Id.
13 See discussion infra Part II.
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categories of individuals who have been most affected by this new
standard, particularly victims of gang violence and battered
women fleeing violence from their partners, as well as some of the
solutions, or lack thereof, courts have implemented to confront
these problem. Finally, Part III provides a solution to the problem
presented by the BIA’s 2014 definition of particular social groups
by looking to Canadian case law and suggests the adoption of a
standard, and indeed a new statutory definition, more closely in
harmony with Canadian jurisprudence.
I.

PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUPS—AN ELUSIVE DEFINITION

The INA provides little guidance toward defining
particular social groups. The only language on point in the act is
general and nonspecific: “the applicant must establish that race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for
persecuting the applicant.”14 Beyond this general statement,
there is no further clarification on what constitutes “membership
in a particular social group.”15 Indeed, even the definition section
of the INA offers no guidance towards understanding Congress’s
meaning of “particular social group.”16
Moreover, Federal Regulations governing adjudication of
asylum applications fail to provide any clearer guidance: “[t]he
applicant has a fear of persecution in his or her country of
nationality . . . on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”17 Again, beyond this
general statement of eligibility, there is no further statement
defining particular social groups.18 Thus, without any statutory or
regulatory guidance, the courts have been forced to fill the gap left
by the INA and the Code of Federal Regulations and provide (what
has become) an evolving definition for the factors which constitute
membership in a particular social group.

Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
See generally id. § 208.
16 See id. § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a). A quick scan of this section shows no
provided definition of “particular social group.” The only relevant language resides at
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining a refugee
as “any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . who is unable
or unwilling to return to . . . that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.”).
17 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A) (2017); see also id. § 208.13(b)(1).
18 See generally id. § 208.13.
14

15
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Particular Social Groups Prior to -,++). !' "(#(*( and
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Prior to the current disputed case law, the prevailing
definition of particular social groups came from Matter of Acosta
which focused on an individual’s characteristics that cannot be
changed.19 Utilizing concepts from the U.N. definition of refugees,
the BIA held that “‘[p]ersecution on account of membership in a
particular social group’ refers to persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”20 In Acosta,
the applicant claimed fear of returning to his native country of El
Salvador because he was a member of a taxi cooperative targeted
by local guerillas because of the group’s refusal to conduct work
stoppages.21 The court found that such a group failed to meet the
immutability requirement because “members of the group could
avoid the threats of the guerillas either by changing jobs or by
cooperating in work stoppages.”22 The court further pointed out
that these threats were “something [the applicant] had the power
to change, so that he was able by his own actions to avoid the
persecution of the guerillas.”23
These characteristics, however, do not have to be those
that are impossible to change. Indeed, in further defining an
immutable characteristic, the court noted “it must be one that
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
identities or consciences.”24 Such characteristics might be “sex,
color, or kinship ties.”25 The court even allowed for the remote
possibility that “shared past experience[s]” might constitute the
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985).
Id. at 212; see also id. at 233 (explaining that the “the other four grounds of
persecution enumerated in . . . the [U.N.] Protocol restrict refugee status to individuals
who are either unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be
required, to avoid persecution”); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Jan. 1982)
(explaining that “[a] ‘particular social group’ normally comprises persons of similar
background, habits or social status. A claim to fear of persecution under this heading
may frequently overlap with a claim to fear of persecution on other grounds, i.e. race,
religion or nationality”).
21 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234.
22 Id. It seems that the court, in its rejection of the taxi cooperation’s
immutability, suggests and even encourages criminal cooperation with the guerillas, or,
at the very least, succumbing to the violent threats of one’s persecutors. The court is
essentially taking the view that Acosta could have prevented harm or further
persecution by giving in to the demands and threats of his abusers.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 233.
25 Id.
19
20
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fundamental and immutable glue holding together a particular
social group, but the limitations on such a trait are so strict as
to hardly be useful to the average asylum seeker.26 The court
rationalized the structure of its immutability definition by
comparing the particular social group to the other protected
grounds (i.e., race, religion, political opinion, and nationality).27
The court concluded that these traits are so fundamental to the
person that it would be impossible to change, or the person
should not be forced to alter his or her ways.28 Such a shared
trait, like a strongly held religious belief or political affiliation,
are so critical to the identity of the asylum seeker that the
United States would offer protection and safe haven rather than
force the applicant to face persecution in his or her native
country.29 Moreover, as the Acosta court noted, these immutable
traits are either impossible for the asylum seeker to change, or
they should not be made to change, and thus, are worthy of
government protection. “The ‘protected characteristics approach’
supports the fundamental ideals behind the Refugee Convention
of safeguarding the core human rights of individuals when their
state refuses to or fails to provide protection.”30 The definition of
particular social group offered in Acosta, crafted solely around a
shared immutable characteristic, was the prominent authority
on defining this protected ground, and remains an essential
element in the BIA’s new tripartite construction.31
As the definition and surrounding case law evolved, the BIA
included additional factors that were invariably used to set the
outermost borders around particular social groups. Chief among
these elements was the “social visibility” requirement.32 In two
successive cases in 2006 and 2007, the BIA reaffirmed and made
concrete the requirement that an asylum seeker demonstrate
visibility to form a cognizable particular social group.33 In Matter of
C-A-, the BIA found that “[t]he group of ‘former noncriminal drug
Id.
Id. at 234.
28 Id.
29 Id. (“By construing ‘persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group’ in this manner, we preserve the concept that refuge is restricted to
individuals who are either unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience
should not be required, to avoid persecution.”).
30 Helen P. Grant, Survival of Only the Fittest Social Groups: The
Evolutionary Impact of Social Distinction and Particularity, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 895,
905 (2017).
31 See discussion infra Section I.B.
32 Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007); Matter of C-A-,
23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
33 Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 69; Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. at 951.
26
27

1154

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:3

informants working against the Cali drug cartel’ does not have the
requisite social visibility to constitute a ‘particular social group.’”34
First, the court applied the Acosta formulation to determine the
immutability of the Respondent’s particular social group based
upon shared past experiences.35 The BIA conceded, “[a] past
experience is, by its very nature, immutable, as it has already
occurred and cannot be undone.”36 The court, however, quickly
pulled back from this broader, perhaps more humanitarian view of
past experiences.37 Thus, even informants who have provided
information on Colombian drug cartels, an experience that would
certainly leave an individual at risk of danger will not be able to
demonstrate a sufficient past experience to form a particular social
group. If we assume the humanitarian purpose of asylum law,38 as
its function would suggest, then this extreme limitation on the
application of the immutability of shared past experiences, in the
face of an obvious and unavoidable danger, pushes away from that
spirit, and perhaps even Congress’s intent in drafting and passing
INA § 208. Nonetheless, even after eliminating the possibility of
forming a particular social group for failure to meet the Acosta
standard, the BIA proceeded to analyze the proposed social group
in light of the social visibility requirement.39
In its analysis, the court in Matter of C-A- paralleled
“visibility” with “recognizablility.”40 The court looked to “the
extent to which members of the purported group would be
recognizable to others” in the native country or locality of the
applicant.41 Further clarifying this standard, the BIA noted that
these characteristics should be “highly visible and recognizable
by others in the country in question.”42 Through this additional
requirement, the court sought to distinguish particular social
groups from overly broad, liberally constructed groups. For
instance, the court distinguished between a “group” comprised
of informants who report information to authorities out of a
sense of “civic responsibility”—which would be considered an
overbroad social group—against a “group” of informants who do
Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 951.
Id. at 958–59.
36 Id. at 958.
37 Id.
38 See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HEARING ON “ASYLUM ABUSE: IS IT
OVERWHELMING OUR BORDERS?” 1 (2013) (noting that “[t]he United States has long held
to the principle that it will not return a foreign national to a country where his or her
life or freedom would be threatened.”).
39 Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959–61.
40 Id. at 959.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 960.
34

35
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so in return for monetary compensation.43 In applying this
requirement to the Respondent, whose membership in the group
of “former noncriminal drug informants working against the
Cali drug cartel”44 was the basis of his claim, the court pointed
out that “it is difficult to conclude that any ‘group,’ as actually
perceived by the cartel, is much narrower than the general
population of Colombia.”45 The social group must not only be
visible and recognized by—at least some—members of that
society, but must also be distinguishable from the society at
large.46 The court here implies that a group may satisfy the
visibility requirement if they are recognizable group to the
persecutors, rather than to society at large.47
The court solidified the social visibility requirement one
year later in Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-.48 Here, the Respondent
claimed that he was kidnapped, held for one month, and shot
while in captivity, all because of his membership in the
particular social group of “affluent Guatemalans.”49 Following
his release, he and his wife received demands for money and
threats against their lives from an anonymous criminal element
in Guatemala,50 forcing them to constantly relocate.51 Despite
their continuous relocations, the Respondent alleged that the
threats persisted, finally forcing them to flee to the United
States.52 The Respondent further contended that this
harassment was due to his family’s membership in the group
consisting of “higher socio-economic Guatemalans.”53 The court
commenced its analysis in the same fashion as in Matter of C-A, and could have dismissed the claim with its application of the
Acosta immutability threshold.54 Instead, the court offered no
underlying basis for its reasoning, upholding the Immigration
Judge’s determination that “‘wealth’ is not an immutable
characteristic,”55 by applying the social visibility analysis to the
wealthy Guatemalan social group.56

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id.
Id. at 951 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 961.
Id. at 959–60.
See id. at 961.
Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A 2007).
Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 71–72.
Id. at 69–70.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 73–74.
Id. at 73 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 74–75.
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In solidifying the reestablishment of the social visibility
requirement, the court turned to the factors discussed in Matter of
C-A- and clarified that “the attributes of a particular social group
must be recognizable and discrete.”57 The BIA adds further
limitation by providing that “a social group cannot be defined
exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to
harm.”58 Thus, there can be no circularly defined groups—a group
that has been persecuted cannot be defined by such persecution.
Instead, there must be some underlying, unifying (and now visible)
reasoning for that persecution, and which is the basis for such
targeted mistreatment. Social visibility, thus, will “be considered
in the context of the country” in question.59 The court then reviewed
the country conditions in Guatemala at the time of the
Respondent’s departure, and concluded that “violence and crime in
Guatemala appear to have been pervasive at all socio-economic
levels.”60 With crime rampant at all areas of Guatemalan society,
the court found that the alleged targeting of affluent members of
society would be no different than the targeting of those
Guatemalans of lesser means.61 Thus, even “[f]rom the point of view
of a criminal bent on extortion, persons with relatively modest
resources or income may possess sufficient land, crops, or other
forms of wealth to make them potential targets.”62 As the wealthy
and not wealthy are indistinguishable to the criminal looking to
take from the easiest victim, a group composed of the affluent
hoping to escape such extortion fails to demonstrate the required
level of visibility. It should again be noted that the court seems to
be willing to consider visibility from the perspective of the
persecutor and not just from the point of view of that society as a
whole.63 Thus, as long as a group is visible to the category of
persecutors the victim seeks to escape, the group may meet the
standard set by Matter of C-A- and solidified by in Matter of A-ME and J-G-U-.
Having already eliminated the possibility of the
Respondent’s group succeeding under the other two separate
qualifying factors, the court thus added the third element of
particularity. The BIA further attempted to close in the borders of
the particular social group definition by adding another essential
factor, concluding that elements “to be considered in determining
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 74 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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whether a particular social group exists include . . . whether the
group can be defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its
membership.”64 In applying the new particularity element to the
Respondent’s purported social group, the court found that “[t]he
terms ‘wealthy’ and ‘affluent’ standing alone are too amorphous.”65
The BIA justified this conclusion by noting that since “the concept
of wealth is so indeterminate, the proposed group could vary from
as little as 1 percent to as much as 20 percent of the population, or
more.”66 Thus, the defining trait of the group is overbroad, failing
to impose sufficient limitation to form a cognizable social group.67
In clarifying particularity, the BIA noted that often constructions
of particular social groups will constitute those “at the margins” of
society, rather than large groups defined by characteristics that are
“too subjective, inchoate, and variable.”68 The court here provided
less of an affirmative definition of particularity, or even of visibility,
than they explained what would not be considered sufficient to
establish these requirements. Using an inverse analysis, the court
explained how affluent Guatemalans are not a particularly defined
social group to establish the particularity standard going forward.
By defining in the negative, the court failed of offer adequate
guidelines for applicants begging for protection and safe haven in
the United States.
The BIA’s evolution of how to define a particular social
group thus did not constitute any sort of rigid test. These cases
show how the lack of formulation of these inadequately defined
factors did not constitute a three-part test where each requirement
must be satisfied to achieve particular social group status. Only
more recently has the BIA turned to create such a rigid formula.
B.

The Current Standard—Particular Social Groups under
Matter of W-G-R- and Matter of M-E-V-G-

In 2014, in two simultaneously decided cases, the BIA
consolidated the disparate factors of particular social group
eligibility, factors of varying degrees of importance, into a
standard three-element test.69 Going forward, these rules apply
to any applicant seeking asylum as a member of a particular
social group. The rule, as announced, is as follows: to qualify as
Id. at 69.
Id. at 76.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
64

65
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a member of a particular social group, it must be established
that “the group is (1) composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3)
socially distinct within the society in question.”70
1. Immutable Characteristics
The BIA’s immutability element is no different than that
announced in Matter of Acosta.71 In 2014, the court solidified the
Acosta framework by noting “[t]he critical requirement is that
the defining characteristic of the group must be something that
either cannot be changed or that the group members should not
be required to change in order to avoid persecution.”72 Oddly, the
BIA then proceeded to defend its holding in Acosta, where it
found no immutable characteristic, by pointing out that El
Salvadoran taxi drivers “could avoid the threats of the guerrillas
either by changing jobs or by cooperating in work stoppages.”73
Again, the court is still requiring at least some people to change
certain traits in order to avoid harm or mistreatment, thus
excluding them from the protection of asylum.74
2. Particularity
The court turned next to its interpretation of
particularity, now an essential element of the particular social
group definition.75 The court provided that “particularity” is a
concept “included in the plain language of the Act.”76 Citing to a
Tenth Circuit decision, the BIA noted “the particularity
requirement flows quite naturally from the language of the
statue, which, of course, specifically refers to membership in a
‘particular social group.’”77 As a matter of plain statutory
interpretation, the particularity element would appear to be the
primary intent of Congress when formulating the particular
social group as a protected group. Though the requirement may
apparently be an undisputable consideration Congress has

70 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 208; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. at 227.
71 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 211–12.
72 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (emphasis added).
73 Id. (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (B.I.A. 1985)).
74 Nevertheless, this decision does not change the Acosta immutability
standard. See supra Section I.B; see also Grant, supra note 30, at 905.
75 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. at 213.
76 Id.
77 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d
641, 649 (10th Cir. 2012)).
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imposed on social groups, the definition of “particularity” is not
in the statute and has been left for the BIA to interpret.
Providing further clarification, the BIA expounded on
precedent, noting that this “requirement relates to the group’s
boundaries or . . . the need to put ‘outer limits’ on the definition
of ‘particular social group.’”78 This contextual analysis reviews
the purported group against the social make-up of the country
in question.79 Thus, a particular social group “must also be
discrete and have definable boundaries.”80 But it is imperative
for purposes of particularity, per the court, that the group “not
be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”81
Here, the BIA inversely defined a concept by indicating
what would not meet the requirements. The BIA has provided
little guidance of what would be critically relevant in positively
establishing particularity, but instead outlined a number of
considerations for what would fail to meet that standard.
Perhaps this is because particularity “chiefly addresses the
question of delineation,” which marks a group as other, different,
and separate from the whole of society.82 The BIA pointed out
that such determinations on particularity, and indeed on the
entire particular social group definition, must be made on a caseby-case basis due to the varying social and cultural
considerations impacting these potential groups.83 Even
considering the fact-specific nature of such analyses, the
particularity requirement seems to only be a “limiting
characteristic,”84 a tool by which the courts use, perhaps to
reduce the administrative burden an increased amount of social
group approvals would incur, to carve out and trim such groups
out of the larger sections of society.
3. Social Distinction
In these dual opinions, the BIA then proceeded to analyze the
final factor in the tripartite particular social group formulation: social
distinction. Renamed but not entirely distinguished from “social
visibility,” which “clarifie[s] the importance of perception or
recognition,”85 the court opted to rename this factor to point out that

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 238 (B.I.A. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214; see also Grant, supra note 30, at 918–19.
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214–15.
Id. at 215 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 216.

1160

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:3

literal visibility is not required.86 As a person espousing a protected
political opinion or the fearful religious believer is not “‘ocularly’
visible,” neither does a member of a particular social group need to
demonstrate such literal visibility.87 Perception, not sight, is
required.88 The court offered further clarification by announcing a
fuller definition of social distinction—“there must be evidence
showing that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes
persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group.”89
Moreover, members of such groups do not need to be easily
identifiable to society, but “must be commonly recognized that the
shared characteristic is one that defines the group.”90 The defining
glue that unites members of the group must be the shared trait; the
shared trait cannot be some superfluous characteristic that is
common among members, but is not the definitive feature forming
group membership.91 Unlike particularity, however, social distinction
cannot be established based upon the “perception of an applicant’s
persecutors.”92 The court reasoned that such a prohibition is
warranted due to the concern of circularly defined particular social
groups (i.e., “a social group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact
that its members have been subjected to harm.”).93
In applying the new standard to the applicant’s specific
circumstances in Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA limited the breadth
and scope of what facts will sufficiently meet the requirements of
a particular social group. The court found that the Respondent’s
purported group—“former members of the Mara 18 gang in El
Salvador who have renounced their gang membership”—failed to
establish a cognizable social group under the announced
formulation.94 The particular social group claim is defeated on
both the particularity and social distinction requirements.95
Firstly, with regard to particularity, the BIA found that the
group was “too diffuse, . . . broad and subjective”96 noting that,
as described, the group was open-ended and “could include
persons of any age, sex, or background.”97 The court implied that
a group such as the one proposed would need to be characterized
as those gang members who have had “meaningful involvement”
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 216–17.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 218.
Id. (quoting In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I & N Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007)).
Id. at 221 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 221.
Id.
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in the gang.98 As asserted by the court, the purported group could
include members who were recruited as youths but left
immediately after joining and it might include members who
have only recently left behind their gang membership after years
of criminal service.99 Thus, “the boundaries of the group . . . are
not adequately defined.”100
Next, the court held that the Respondent’s group failed
to meet the social distinction element because they did not have
clear evidence that “Salvadoran society considers former gang
members who have renounced their gang membership”
constituted a distinct group.101 The court then referred to
submitted evidence that indicated there was a “stigma against
former gang members because of their tattoos.”102 The court,
however, diminished such evidence by pointing out that it is not
clear that this stigma exists due to the fact that the individuals
are former gang members, or because the tattoos may lead
others to consider them as active gang members.103
Unlike in Matter of W-G-R-, the Court in Matter of M-EV-G- was not so quick to discard the proposed social group on the
grounds of social distinction and particularity. There, the
Respondent’s proposed particular social group was “Honduran
youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but who have
refused to join because they oppose the gangs.”104 Following a
recitation of precedent and the announcement of the new threepart test, the BIA remanded the case back to the Immigration
Judge to “revisit the issues,” especially since “the respondent’s
proposed particular social group has evolved during the
pendency of his appeal.”105 Thus, at least on first glance, the BIA
may be receptive to the applicant’s gang-related social group
since the court did not immediately reject the construction of
“Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but
who have refused to join because they oppose the gangs.”
Thus, the BIA’s three-part rubric provided a road map for
potential asylum seekers. This road map, however, is fraught
with inconsistency and vagueness. 106 As discussed in the
proceeding Sections, victims fleeing both gang-based and
Id.
Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 222.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014).
105 Id. at 252. What happened to M-E-V-G-’s claim is unknown. There is no
public case history following the BIA’s remand.
106 For a discussion of subsequent case law see infra Parts II and III.
98
99
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domestic violence have experienced differing applications of the
new three-part standard.107
A glimpse of how this all may play out occurred in the
Ninth Circuit in Rios v. Lynch.108 Considering the BIA’s new
standard, the Ninth Circuit found that “[e]ven under this refined
framework, the family remains the quintessential particular
social group.”109 Even though that court’s prior holdings hinted
that family relations would constitute membership in a
particular social group when that relation was tied to one of the
other four protected grounds. The court refused to hold that this
would be the only manner in which a cognizable social group
could be established via family relationships. In fact, the court
noted that “few groups are more readily identifiable than the
family.”110 With a liberal analysis of the BIA’s elements, the
Ninth Circuit may be setting the stage for a less stringent
application of the new three-part test.
II.

TYPES OF CLAIMS MOST AFFECTED BY THE BIA’S NEW
STANDARD FOR PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUPS

The BIA’s three-part test has been problematic mostly
when applied to specific categories of individuals who,
heretofore, have been unable to achieve particular social group
status.111 The BIA has, to varying degrees, applied limited
flexibility to groups seemingly outside the reach of this new
test.112 But where one category of people has caused a relaxing of
the standard, others have received a rigid application of the test.
“In the twenty-first century, it is former gang members, youth
vulnerable to recruitment by gangs, . . . females subject to forced
sexual relationships with gang members, and informants on
drug cartels and organized crime that form a sample of the
groups now seeking protection under the [particular social
group] ground.”113 Given this influx of particular social group
See infra Part II.
Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2015).
109 Id. at 1128.
110 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
111 See Timothy Greenberg, The United States Is Unwilling to Protect GangBased Asylum Applicants, 61 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 473, 474–75 (2017). For a more detailed
discussion see infra Section III.B.
112 See Alicia Triche, Matter of A-R-C-G- and Domestic Violence as Persecution:
Assessing the First Two Years After A Landmark Decision, 63 FED. LAW. 8 (2016),
http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/The-Federal-Lawyer-August-2016.aspx?FT=.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DB6T-LDMN]; see generally Johanna K. Bachimair, Asylum at Last: Matter of
A-R-C-G-’s Impact on Domestic Violence Victims Seeking Asylum, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
1053, 1055–56 (2016). For a more detailed discussion see infra Section II.A.
113 Grant, supra note 30, at 899.
107

108
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cases, no group of people has received more deference than
battered women, whereas no group has been boxed out by the
court quite like victims fleeing gang violence.
A.

Women Fleeing Domestic Violence

The BIA seemed to have quickly realized the need to mold
its standard to provide relief to battered women escaping their
native countries due to abusive domestic situations. Matter of AR-C-G- not only provides a step-by-step guideline for how such
women can meet the particular social group standard but shows
the extent to which the elements can be molded (or, more
cynically, manipulated) to comply with BIA guidance.114
Appropriately, the BIA analyzed the Respondent’s claim on a
point-by-point basis, taking each newly refined element in turn.
The purported social group in Matter of A-R-C-G- is “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship.”115 First, without much analysis, the court noted
that “the group is composed of members who share the common
immutable characteristic of gender.”116
Next, the court analyzed the Respondent’s group against
the particularity requirement. The court notes that terms such
as “married, women, and unable to leave the relationship—have
commonly accepted definitions within Guatemalan society.”117
Thus, such terms will “combine to create a group with discrete
and definable boundaries.”118 In defending this analysis, the
court notes further “that a married woman’s inability to leave a
relationship” can be influenced not only by restrictions related
to the termination of marriages, but also, and perhaps most
critically, by “societal expectations about gender and
subordination.”119 Thus, the group of the Respondent’s proposed
group is particular.120
Finally, the court turns to the question of social
distinction. The BIA looks to whether the particular society in
question makes meaningful distinctions on the common
immutable characteristics of being a woman in a domestic
relationship she cannot leave.121 Further, in determining
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A. 2014).
Id. at 388 (internal quotations omitted).
116 Id. at 392. It must be noted that the BIA has historically found sex to be an
immutable characteristic. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
117 A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393 (internal quotations omitted).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 394.
114

115
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whether society considers these groups socially distinct, it is
significant “whether the society in question recognizes the need
to offer protection to victims of domestic violence, including
whether the country has criminal laws designed to protect
domestic abuse victims, whether those laws are effectively
enforced, and other sociopolitical factors.”122 In analyzing the
Respondent’s claim, the court found that there was a “culture of
‘machismo and family violence’” which the laws of the native
country, and the enforcement of those laws, failed to adequately
address.123 Thus, the Respondent’s group was socially distinct
within the meaning of the BIA’s 2014 standard.
Matter of A-R-C-G- provides a roadmap for battered
women seeking asylum in the United States, but it is also an
indication of the flexibility of an otherwise rigidly applied threepart standard. Such lenient application, while a progressive
shift in the right direction, has not been provided to other
categories of individuals, particularly victims of gang violence.124
The degree and nature of the abuse and mistreatment
suffered by the applicant, however, will limit the applicability of
the domestic violence social group. The First Circuit has recently
erected a potential barrier to the battered women social group. In
Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, the First Circuit held that “Salvadoran
women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as
property” did not demonstrate the requisite immutability and
social distinction.125 The social distinction issue is easily
distinguished from Matter of A-R-C-G- as the circumstances of the
two cases are eminently different. In A-R-C-G-, the abuse was
“repugnant” and significant.126 Vega-Ayala’s situation, however,
was “a far cry from the circumstances in A-R-C-G-.”127 The
Respondent never lived with her partner, they were only together
eighteen months (for twelve of those eighteen months her partner
was in jail), and when they were together, he saw her only two
times a week.128 Given the circumstances, the court found there
was no evidence to “set apart” her group from others in society.129
The question of immutability, however, is more troubling.
The A-R-C-G- court concluded that the Respondent’s gender was

122
123
124
125

omitted).
126
127
128
129

Id.
Id. at 394–95.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotations
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sufficient to meet the immutability standard.130 For the Vega-Ayala
court, however, gender is not the defining factor. In fact, gender
never even enters the calculation.131 Indeed, the First Circuit noted
that “[b]eing in an intimate relationship with a partner who views
you as property is not an immutable characteristic.”132 Further, the
First Circuit misconstrued the plain language of the BIA in A-R-CG-, noting that the purported group in that case “may share an
immutable trait, where specific facts demonstrated a woman’s
inability to leave her abusive marriage.”133 Certainly, those facts
were relevant to the BIA’s holding in A-R-C-G-, but to social
distinction and particularity, not immutability.134
B.

Gangs

Following the new standard set by the BIA, particular
social group asylum claims related to gangs and gang-related
violence have increasingly failed to cross the three-part test
threshold and be recognized as cognizable social groups.135 More
specifically, courts have found that these claims do not fulfill the
social distinction, visibility, and particularity requirements.136
Indeed, this is not a new phenomenon; prior to the 2014 BIA
standard, gang-related claims regularly failed.137 The BIA’s new
consolidated standard, however, has solidified the near
impossibility for fleeing victims of gang violence to form a
cognizable social group, leaving countless individuals with
credible claims of persecution without any form of relief.

Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392 (B.I.A. 2014).
Vega-Ayala, 833 F.3d at 39.
132 Id. at 39.
133 Id.
134 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393.
135 See Grant, supra note 30, at 929–33.
136 See Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 401 (11th Cir. 2016); Juarez
Chilel v. Holder, 779 F.3d 850, 854–55 (8th Cir. 2015); Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780
F.3d 982, 989 (10th Cir. 2015).
137 See Tay-Chan v. Holder, 699 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding that the
particular social group of “‘victims of gang threats and possible extortion’ as overly broad
and having insufficient particularity to meet the social group criterion.”); Beltrand-Alas
v. Holder, 689 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding that the particular social group of
“people who oppose gang[s]” lacked the requisite particularity and visibility); Gaitan v.
Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that the particular social group of
“young males from El Salvador who have been subjected to recruitment by MS–13 and
who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on personal opposition to
the gang” was “no different from any other Salvadoran . . . that has experienced gang
violence” (quoting Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2011))); Larios v.
Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that the particular social group of
“youth resistant to gang recruitment” lacked the necessary visibility and particularity
requirements (quoting Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, at 26–27 (1st Cir. 2010))).
130

131
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Since the 2014 standard, a number of circuit courts have
taken an even more demanding approach to gang-based asylum
claims. A recent example of the courts’ bias against such claims is
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Juarez Chilel v. Holder.138 The
Eighth Circuit upheld the BIA’s decision to affirm the Immigration
Judge’s denial of the alien’s application for relief via Withholding
of Removal.139 The court concluded that the application for
“withholding of removal . . . fails” because he “has offered no
evidence to support the conclusion that his purported
group . . . shares a ‘common immutable characteristic,’ is ‘defined
with particularity,’ or is sufficiently distinct to qualify as a
‘particular social group.’”140 Chilel’s claim of particular social
group—in his case, “those who refuse to join a gang and suffer from
threats of violence as a result”141—was based upon an alleged,
albeit brief family history with gang violence in his native country
of Guatemala142 and to his own encounters with gang members
prior to his departure from that country.143 The court found that
Chilel’s social group was based upon a circular definition where
suffering violence was a defining characteristic of the group,144
rather than a result of some other trait. More significantly,
however, the Eighth Circuit upheld the BIA’s reasoning that
victims who suffer gang violence following a refusal to join the
gangs do not meet either the visibility or particularity
requirements.145 Oddly, the court also noted that Chilel failed to
establish membership in a group that shared an immutable
characteristic, while also defining “immutable characteristic” as a
“shared past experience.”146 Certainly, refusal to join a gang can
constitute a unifying past experience.147 And surely that past
experience is shared by countless and diverse individuals in areas
overrun by gang activity—as demonstrated by the high influx of
these types of asylum claims in the last two decades.148
Nevertheless, claims by individuals resistant to gang violence will

Juarez Chilel v. Holder, 779 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 855–56. Withholding of Removal is a similar claim to asylum based
upon nexus to the same protected grounds. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 853.
143 Id. at 852.
144 Id. at 855.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 854 (internal quotations omitted).
147 See Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
shared past experience of being “former truckers who resisted FARC and collaborated
with authorities” may constitute a particular social group).
148 Grant, supra note 30, at 899.
138

139
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fall short of the definition in the Eight Circuit as such groups are
“too diffuse to be recognized as a particular social group.”149
Under a similar set of facts, the Tenth Circuit also found a
gang victim’s social group claim lacking under the BIA’s three-part
scheme.150 In Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, however, the applicant
sought to define his social group more thoroughly—“El Salvadoran
males threatened and actively recruited by gangs, who resist
joining because they oppose the gangs.”151 Finding the BIA’s
decisions in 2014 in line with Tenth Circuit precedent regarding
social visibility, the court concluded that Rodas “failed to
demonstrate his proposed group is socially distinct.”152 Unlike in
Chilel, Rodas’ past experience with gangs was more significant,
occurring over the course of several years.153 When he was a
teenager, the MS-13 gang in El Salvador pressured Rodas to join,
and upon his refusals, threatened his life, offered him “protection,”
and, in one instance, beat him and left him bleeding on the
ground.154 Rodas’ fear of MS-13 was not limited to his personal
interactions. Rodas’ brother-in-law was murdered by gang
members after he failed to make an extortion payment.155
In evaluating these facts, the court first noted that no evidence
was provided to demonstrate that “Salvadorans . . . perceive
individuals who resist gang recruitment as a distinct social group.”156
The perceptions of others again plays a significant role in setting the
outermost boundaries of a distinct social group. What society
perceives will allow a group to be formed. In Rodas, the court took a
strict stance against finding those who refuse gang recruitment as
forming a distinct social group, noting that “[t]he
evidence . . . depicts a widespread gang violence problem in El
Salvador.”157 Therefore, “although gang members may have
targeted Mr. Rodas-Orellana for resisting recruitment, this reflects
generalized gang violence toward anyone resisting their efforts
rather than defining a distinct social group.”158 Thus, even
acknowledging his past persecution, and seemingly conceding the
immutability and particularity requirements in Rodas’ favor (by

149 Juarez Chilel, 779 F.3d at 855 (quoting Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749,
754 (8th Cir. 2011).
150 Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2015).
151 Id. at 991.
152 Id. at 992–93.
153 Id. at 987.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 988.
156 Id. at 992.
157 Id. at 993.
158 Id.
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completely omitting a discussion of these elements), the court
concluded that a particular social group had not been established.
Turning to an entirely separate calculation of gang-based
asylum claims, in 2016 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of a
claim based upon the proposed social group of “former members of
the Mara-18 gang from Honduras.”159 In Gonzalez v. U.S. Attorney
General, the Respondent was recruited by Mara-18 as a fourteenyear-old child.160 “[U]nder a sense of coercion,” Gonzalez participated
in violent gang activities.161 According to Gonzales, “disobedience
would result in . . . potentially even death.”162 He participated in
gang activities for about two years until, following a severe beating
he received from a rival gang, he felt it necessary to flee to the United
States.163 According to Gonzalez, death is the punishment Mara-18
inflicts upon members who leave the gang.164 Again, the court upheld
the BIA’s decision to dismiss the asylum claim, citing Gonzalez’s
failure to demonstrate the particularity of his particular social
group.165 The Eleventh Circuit deferred to the BIA’s analysis,
indicating that Gonzalez’s “social group was too diffuse, broad, and
subjective.”166 The court reasoned that such a social group could
include anyone, irrespective of “age, sex, or background,”167 and, as
such, was “not limited to those who had meaningful involvement
with the gang.”168 Thus, considerably deeper ties with the gang may
lead to a finding of particularity, where the status of general street
members would fail to reach that threshold.
The relative detail provided for these gang-related
asylum claims serves a twofold purpose: (1) to evince the factspecific nature of asylum law and (2) to demonstrate the seeming
impossibility of obtaining asylum for individuals with genuine
fears of returning to their home countries due to gang-related
persecution. Asylum seekers fleeing gang violence face an uphill
battle when seeking asylum. Often, these groups will fail despite
a showing of fear and the possibility of continued violence upon
their return to their native countries. Despite even the most
obvious credibility of the applicant, failing to formulate a
specifically defined particular social group, a nebulous concept
to begin with, will result in the denial of the claim or, even worse,
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 401 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 405.
Id. (quoting Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I & N Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 2014)).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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removal from the United States.169 Elements of credibility and
fear have been highlighted in this note above not for sympathy,
but to clearly illustrate how far the BIA’s new standard has
strayed from the humanitarian purpose of asylum law—a
statutory scheme enacted to provide a safe haven to those fleeing
enormous dangers and persecution.
In order to succeed in meeting the BIA’s three-part
requirement, it is imperative that gang victims, and former gang
members, carefully assess the formulation of their particular
social group, adding the same detailed specificity permitted for
victims of domestic violence.170 Yet even if such asylum seekers
plead the appropriate specificity, courts have not provided gangbased claims the same deference that such gender-based claims
have received.171 Perhaps this is a side effect of a system
correcting itself to provide much needed protection for a class of
individuals, battered women, who have faced a long history of
neglect. Regardless of the motivation, the disparity between
these domestic-violence cases and the treatment of gang-based
social groups is striking. The linguistic acrobatics that must be
accomplished to fit a domestic-violence claim into the threeparty requirement entirely undermines the strict application the
BIA’s tripartite test has received when applied to gang-related
claims. Certainly, such a distinction may constitute a
development in favor of progress and a widening of the
humanitarian mission of asylum law. The courts, however, must
then allow for other categories of at-risk groups to catch up.
III.

A SOLUTION FROM THE NORTH: A NEW STATUTORY
DEFINITION

Due to the vagueness and inconsistency in the definition of
“particular social group,” reform is needed to correct the difficult
path facing individuals hoping to qualify for asylum as a member
of particular social group. Total revision of the INA, or even of the
section governing asylum claims, is not necessary. Rather, this
note proposes that Congress add a definition of “particular social
group” to the INA, either in the act’s definition section172 or within
the asylum section following the enumeration of the protected
grounds.173 As Canada now sees more asylum claims than the
country has in over two decades, seeking guidance in Canadian
169
170
171
172
173

Greenberg, supra note 111, at 475.
See discussion supra Sections III.A–B.
Id.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
Id. § 208(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c).
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asylum law is particularly timely.174 As the United States removes
protections for certain vulnerable noncitizens, Canada has seen a
reciprocal rise in asylum applications.175 Congress must act to
provide a legal pathway to safe haven in the United States for such
individuals. Such statutory guidance would provide courts with
clear guidance on the application of the particular social group
standard. How then do we consider such reform? Should BIA
precedent form the backbone of such a rewiring of the INA’s social
group definition—precedent which has confused and has closed out
entire categories of individuals? Or should we look elsewhere for
inspiration, perhaps even to other jurisdictions or nations?
Congress should look to Canadian case law when drafting
a new particular social group definition in order to adopt a
revised standard. In 1993, the Canadian Supreme Court
announced its Canada v. Ward decision,176 which provided a
“good working rule” for the meaning of particular social group.177
The Canadian Supreme Court provided that membership in a
particular social group can be satisfied if the group falls into one
of three categories: “(1) groups defined by an innate,
unchangeable characteristic; (2) groups whose members
voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human
dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association;
and (3) groups associated by a former voluntary status,
unalterable due to its historical permanence.”178 While much
broader than the current U.S. definition, the Canadian standard
clings closely to the humanitarian mission of asylum law: to
protect and provide safe haven to those fleeing violence and
mistreatment.179 Rather than delimit group membership under
the standard, such a widely drawn standard will permit many
to claim asylum whose claims would otherwise have failed.
Taking the Canadian example as inspiration, a new
definition, currently absent in the INA, should be included in the
statutory scheme, eliminating the need for an evolving,

174 Tara Carman, Canada’s Acceptance Rate of Asylum Seekers is the Highest in
27 Years—Here’s Why, CBC, (Feb. 7, 2018, 4:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
asylum-seekers-overview-data-1.4503825 [https://perma.cc/5QY4-JLLA].
175 THE CANADIAN PRESS, Salvadoran Asylum Seekers Could Test Canada’s
Immigration System, CBC, (Jan. 7, 2018, 5:23 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/elsalvador-canada-immigration-surge-1.4476961 [https://perma.cc/WL87-XW5L].
176 Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ward, 2 S.C.R. 689 (1993).
177 Id. at 692. The Canadian Supreme Court also outlines criteria for political
opinion asylum claims, clarifies issues of evidence, and reviews certain criminal exclusions.
178 Id. at 78–79.
179 See WASEM, supra note 38, at 1.
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judicially conceived standard. The note proposes the following
definition of social group is included in the INA180:
A ‘particular social group’ is a group whose members:
(1) share a common, immutable characteristic;
(2) share a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical
permanence; or
(3) share an unalterable opinion or belief that is neither religious nor
political in nature.

As noted in Ward, such a three-tier definition would provide
“a good working rule” to classify particular social group
membership.181 No longer will the boundaries of particular social
group membership tighten around the necks of those excluded due
to the BIA’s 2014 definition. Rather, the limits will broaden and
new classes of individuals who have otherwise been excluded, will
now qualify under this more humanitarian construction.
For instance, the “former members of the Mara 18 gang in
El Salvador who have renounced their gang membership” from WG-R-182 would indeed qualify under Subsection 2 of the proposed
statute as individuals who “share a former voluntary status,
unalterable due to its historical permanence.” Applicants who
simply shared the current status as ex-gang members would
satisfy the particular social group membership requirement.
Similarly, the proposed group of “Honduran youth who have been
actively recruited by gangs but who have refused to join because
they oppose the gangs” of M-E-V-G-183 would now qualify under
subsection (3) of the proposed statute as persons who “share an
unalterable opinion or belief that is neither religious nor political
in nature.” The group members’ opposition to gang recruitment
unifies them into a single particular social group. Moreover,
victims of domestic violence, as in A-R-C-G-, would satisfy
Subsection 2 of the proposed statute given their former voluntary
status as the domestic partner of their abuser.184
First, the Canadian inspired definition will cover the
claims victims of domestic violence, women viewed as property
by their partners, and women who are unable to leave a domestic
relationship. This new definition would fall under the
Subsection 2 of the definition: share a former voluntary status,
180 The proposed addition to the INA would be included as a new subsection (i)
to § 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A).
181 Ward, 2 S.C.R at 692.
182 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
183 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014).
184 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. 388 (B.I.A. 2014)
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unalterable due to its historical permanence. These applicants’
status as former partners of abusers, who are regarded in such
an objectified fashion, are all united by the single fact of their
former voluntary status as domestic partners in societies that
view women as a second-class gender. The prevailing culture of
machismo in those countries will help to inform the court’s
analysis of such claims, as in A-R-C-G-.185 It is not the shared
experience of being domestic-violence victims that will unite
these applicants—that would be circular and against the BIA’s
clear interpretation of the nexus requirement.186 Rather, their
former status as partners in such socio-cultural atmospheres
will provide the necessary unifying factor.
With regard to victims of gang violence, the analysis will
be twofold. Firstly, former gang members will qualify as a
member of a particular social group under Subsection 2: groups
that share a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its
historical permanence. As former gang members who are being
targeted because they have left the gang, their status as former
gang members, a voluntary association, is entirely unalterable.
Thus, assuming the applicant satisfies the necessary nexus
requirement (i.e. demonstrates that his persecution is on
account of his former gang membership) a former gang member
will satisfy the requirements for asylum.
Finally, the victim of gang violence that refuses either
recruitment, extortion, or other gang-related activities, would
classify as a member of a particular social group under
Subsection 3 of the revised definition: groups who share an
unalterable opinion or belief that is neither religious nor
political in nature. These applicants’ mere opposition to the gang
would form the requisite unifying element to classify them as
members of a particular social group. Again, however, the
claimant must sufficiently demonstrate the received persecution
is on account of this opposition to the gangs. The violence or
mistreatment received cannot be mere acts of random street
crime or untargeted acts of mistreatment. Rather the applicant
must provide evidence demonstrating that he either rejected
recruitment into the gang or otherwise refused direct (and
perhaps continued) gang interference in his life. This nexus
requirement will be the delimiting factor to put up boundaries
on the particular social group definition.
Indeed, while the number of claims may increase, and
certainly the number of credible, approved claims will also rise,
185
186

See supra Part II.
See supra Section II.B.
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this new formulation will not result in an overwhelming influx
of illegitimate approvals. The nexus requirement must still be
satisfied. There must be a causal connection between the
victim’s suffering or persecution and the proposed social
group.187
Thus, upon considering the application of the new Wardbased standard against the backdrop of the categories of affected
individuals, this note recommends the revision of the INA to
include such a definition of “particular social group.” This formula
provides a good working definition and will allow applicants that
have been otherwise excluded from demonstrating membership in
a particular social group to now qualify for asylum and the
protection of the United States.
CONCLUSION
BIA and circuit court jurisprudence regarding particular
social groups prior to the decisions in M-E-V-G- and W-G-R- was
plagued by an inconsistent application of a vague and
inconsistently defined standard.188 The BIA’s attempt to
implement a uniform three-part standard, however, has suffered
a similar fate and has been inconsistently applied, particularly
regarding victims of domestic and gang-based violence.189 To
remedy this spiraling inconsistency, Congress must amend the
INA to add a definition of “particular social group.” Such
definition should take cue from Canadian case law, which has
permitted a more expansive application of the particular social
group standard.190 In amending the INA and utilizing Canadian
jurisprudence, Congress will create a uniform approach. This
amendment to the immigration laws will not only ease the
burden on the courts trying to keep up with an evolving body of
case law but will provide potential asylum seekers with a clearer
path to finding safe harbor in the United States.
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